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Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review Missions - Rev. 1
IAEA, 2011, 58 p.
The IAEA’s Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) missions are designed to assist Member States, at their request, in evaluating the status of their national infrastructure for the introduction of a nuclear power programme. Each INIR mission is coordinated and led by the IAEA and conducted by a team of international experts drawn from Member States who have experience in different aspects of developing and deploying nuclear infrastructure.
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The IAEA publication Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power (IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NG-G-3.1) contains a description of 19 infrastructure issues to be considered during the different stages of development of a nuclear power programme. The starting point for an INIR mission is a self-evaluation performed by the Member State against these infrastructure issues. Following the self-evaluation, the INIR mission reviews the status of the national nuclear infrastructure, identifies existing gaps in
specific infrastructure-related areas and proposes recommendations to fill these gaps.
The INIR mission provides Member State representatives with an opportunity to have in depth discussions with international experts about experiences and best practices in different countries. In developing its recommendations, the INIR team takes into account the comments made by the relevant national organizations. Implementation of any of the team’s recommendations is at the discretion of the Member State requesting the mission.
The results of the INIR mission are expected to help the Member State to develop an action plan to fill any gaps, which in turn will help the development of the national nuclear infrastructure. The IAEA stands ready to assist, as requested and appropriate, in the different steps of this action plan.
This guidance publication is directed to assist in preparing and conducting the INIR missions. It was developed under the coordination of the IAEA Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Group (INIG) with contributions from IAEA staff from all involved organizational units and from external experts.
Extraído de:
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/INIR_web.pdf
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Status and Trends in Nuclear Education
IAEA Nuclear Energy Series, 2011, 226 p.
The development of policies and strategies in nuclear education plays an essential role with regard to facilitating sustainable education and training in nuclear science and technology. This publication supports the development of such policies and strategies. In its first part it provides a general overview of activities regarding nuclear knowledge management, nuclear education, and national and regional needs and expectations. The second part presents detailed country reports on the status
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of nuclear education in Member States. These country reports also address partnerships between educational institutions and the nuclear industry, as well as cooperation with government and research organizations. Best practices in nuclear education and recommendations are consolidated in an introductory chapter, which could be useful for easy benchmarking, improvements and formulating strategies.
Extraído de:
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PubDetails.asp?pubId=8514
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Nuclear Waste: Disposal Challenges and Lessons Learned from Yucca Mountain
Government Accountability Office (GAO-US), June 1st 2011, 19 p.
The United States has generated over 75,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste--extremely hazardous substances--at 80 sites in 35 states and is expected to more than double that amount by 2055. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) required the Department of Energy (DOE) to investigate a geologic repository for nuclear waste. In
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1987, Congress amended NWPA to direct DOE to focus on a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. In 2008, DOE submitted a license application for the repository but in March 2010 moved to withdraw it. However, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or the courts--as a result of federal lawsuits--might compel DOE to resume the licensing process. GAO has reported on options for interim storage of this waste and the effects a Yucca Mountain termination could have on both commercial waste and DOE-managed waste. This testimony is based on that prior work and discusses (1) the status of the Yucca Mountain repository and national policy for nuclear waste disposal, (2) options for storing nuclear waste and their benefits and challenges, and (3) principal lessons that can be learned from past nuclear waste management efforts.
Uncertainties exist about the direction of the nation's policy for nuclear waste disposal. Under NWPA, DOE investigated Yucca Mountain as a site for a repository. In 2002, DOE recommended the site to the President and in 2008 submitted a license application to NRC. DOE is now seeking to withdraw the application from NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. DOE did not cite technical or safety issues but stated that Yucca Mountain is not a workable option because of a lack of public acceptance by the people of Nevada. On June 29, 2010, the board denied DOE's motion, ruling that NWPA requires DOE to continue the licensing effort. The NRC commissioners announced they might consider reviewing the board's decision, but as of May 26, 2011, no review had been announced. Separately, state and local governments and a private party filed suit in federal court against DOE and NRC in an effort to stop the repository termination. The court has not yet ruled. Amid this uncertainty, DOE took steps to shut down Yucca Mountain by September 30, 2010. DOE also established a Blue Ribbon Commission to evaluate alternatives for nuclear waste disposal, which plans to report by January 2012. Three primary waste storage options offer benefits but also face challenges, including high costs. Two options are for interim storage--continued on-site or centralized storage--which could allow time for research into new approaches that might have wider public acceptance than the Yucca Mountain permanent repository. Continued on-site storage would require less effort to implement since it is the current method of waste storage. However, this option could trigger significant financial liabilities as a result of industry lawsuits stemming from DOE's failure to accept the waste in 1998, as required under NWPA. The federal government has already paid $956 million, and future liabilities are estimated to be at least $15.4 billion through 2020. DOE and the Navy also might not meet certain commitments to remove their waste from two states, which could bring penalties and a suspension of the Navy's shipments of spent fuel, raising concerns about the Navy's ability to refuel its nuclear-powered warships. The second interim option, centralized interim storage, may face challenges because DOE states that it currently has no authority to implement this option. The third option, a geologic repository, is widely considered the only currently feasible option for permanently disposing of nuclear waste. DOE has faced challenges in identifying an acceptable site for permanent geologic disposal. Restarting the search would likely take decades and cost billions of dollars. Published reports and interviews--with federal, state, and local government officials and representatives of various organizations--suggest two broad lessons that can be learned from past nuclear waste management efforts. First, transparency, economic incentives, and education are important tools for gaining public acceptance. Second, it is important for any waste management strategy to have consistent policy, funding, and leadership, particularly since the process will take decades. An independent organization with a more predictable funding mechanism may be better suited than DOE to oversee nuclear waste management. GAO is making no new recommendations at this time and continues to believe that implementing the recommendations in its March (GAO-11-230) and April 2011 (GAO-11-229) reports could improve DOE's efforts to manage and store nuclear waste.
Extraído de:
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-731T |
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This paper explores the links between changing disaster risks due to climate change and the impacts on electricity generation. Electricity generation is important for powering economic growth. Climate change alters disaster risks for electricity generation.
These considerations are often overlooked in energy research and policy. We want to shed light on a new and emerging research agenda. We assess the vulnerability of various |
electricity generation options - fossil fuels, nuclear power, hydropower and renewable energy - to changing disaster risks and addresses the implications for energy policy and planning.
Finally, the paper makes suggestions how changing disaster risks could be taken into account in electricity generation. Suggestions include: 1. assessing disaster risks in Environmental Impact Assessments, feasibility studies and siting procedures for new power plants; 2. improving the linkages between energy ministries, climate ministries, and disasters ministries in relation to energy policy; 3. planning and developing climate change adaptation strategies for electricity generation.
Extraído de:
http://community.eldis.org/.59d5ba58/LatestClimate%20change%20
disasters%20and%20electricity%20generation.pdf
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Design Lessons Drawn from the Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities
IAEA TECDOC Series, 2011, 102 p.
At a time when many older facilities are being decommissioned and many more are undergoing major retrofits to extend their lives, there is a wealth of information emerging to guide the design of new facilities, to make them easier to rebuild and eventually decommission. In this publication, the most important lessons learned in recent years are organized and examined to enable the intended audience to gauge the importance of this |
aspect of planning for new nuclear facilities. With many new players entering the nuclear field, whether as customers or suppliers, it is important that the lessons learned on this issue be widely and promptly disseminated. This publication presents the issues in a concise and systematic manner, along with practical and thought-provoking examples.
Extraído de:
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PubDetails.asp?pubId=8602 |
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Evaluations complémentaires de sûreté post-Fukushima: comportement des installations nucléaires françaises en cas de situations extrêmes et pertinence des propositions d’améliorations
L’Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire, 17/11/2011, Tome 1 - 214 p.; Tome 2 - 263 p.
Suite à l’accident survenu le 11 mars 2011 dans la centrale de Fukushima Dai-ichi, le premier ministre a demandé à l’Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (ASN) de procéder à un audit de la sûreté des différentes installations nucléaires françaises.
Le 5 mai 2011, l’ASN a pris douze décisions demandant aux
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exploitants nucléaires français de réaliser des évaluations complémentaires de sûreté (ECS) de leurs installations, sur la base d’un cahier des charges annexé aux décisions précitées et cohérent avec le cahier des charges retenu pour les « stress-tests » demandés par le Conseil Européen.
Les ECS visent à prendre en compte les premiers enseignements des événements survenus sur la centrale de Fukushima Dai-ichi, en évaluant la résistance des installations nucléaires françaises à des scénarios extrêmes, allant au-delà des situations prises en compte pour leur dimensionnement. Ces évaluations concernent en 2011 les réacteurs de puissance en exploitation (REP de 900, 1300 et 1450 MWe), ou en construction (EPR), ainsi que certaines installations nucléaires jugées prioritaires par l’ASN (le Réacteur à Haut Flux de Grenoble, le Réacteur Jules Horowitz, le réacteur OSIRIS, l’installation MASURCA, l’Atelier de Technologie du Plutonium, la centrale PHENIX, l’usine MELOX, les établissements de La Hague, de FBFC et, sur le site du Tricastin, les établissements d’AREVA NC, COMURHEX, EURODIF, Georges Besse II et de SOCATRI).
Dans ce cadre, l’ASN a demandé aux Groupes Permanents pour les réacteurs (GPR) et pour les laboratoires et usines (GPU) de lui faire part de leur avis sur ces évaluations complémentaires de sûreté et sur la pertinence des propositions d’amélioration visant à renforcer la sûreté de ces installations en cas de situations extrêmes (séisme, inondation, perte de sources électriques, perte de sources froides), sur la base de l’analyse critique par l’IRSN de ces propositions.
Synthèse du rapport | Tome 1 | Tome 2
Avis relatif aux évaluations complémentaires
Extraído de:
http://www.irsn.fr/FR/expertise/rapports_gp/gp-reacteurs/Pages/Rapport-IRSN-ECS.aspx
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Status of Developments at the Back End of the Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle
IAEA Nuclear Energy Series, 2011, 87 p.
Closed fuel cycle schemes in combination with fast reactors are emerging as the key strategy for sustainable development of nuclear energy. The back end fuel cycles for fast reactors and thermal reactors mainly differ with respect to the reprocessing operations. This publication highlights emerging innovations and R&D needs for the back end of the fast reactor fuel cycle, with emphasis on reprocessing of spent mixed uranium and |
plutonium based ceramic and metallic fuels. The publication has been prepared in collaboration with experts from Member States and will serve as a useful resource for nuclear scientists and engineers involved in fast reactor fuel development as well as reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel for sodium cooled fast reactors.
Extraído de:
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PubDetails.asp?pubId=8356
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Estatuto del Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear
Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN - ES), 2011, 42 p.
El nuevo Estatuto, cuyo texto ha sido elaborado por el propio Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear, aprobado por el Consejo de Ministros y comunicado al Congreso y Senado tal como dispone el artículo 1 de su Ley constitutiva, ha sido publicado en el Boletín Oficial del Estado, fijándose en la disposición final única su entrada en vigor el día siguiente al de dicha publicación, quedando derogados, según la disposición derogatoria única, el Real Decreto 1157/1982, de 30 de abril, por el que se
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aprobaba el Estatuto anterior, junto a la disposición adicional cuarta del Real Decreto 1339/1999, de 31 de julio, por el que se aprobó el Reglamento de la Comisión Nacional de Energía, y finamente, cuantas disposiciones de igual o inferior rango se opongan a lo establecido en el mismo.
Extraído de:
http://www.csn.es/images/stories/publicaciones/unitarias/normativa/
estatuto_espaol.pdf
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Report of the External Advisory Committee Examining the Response of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission to the 2011 Japanese Nuclear Event
External Advisory Committee , April 12, 2012, 51 p.
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) has established an external advisory committee to assess the organization’s processes and responses in light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear incident, which has highlighted the importance of nuclear safety around the world.
Committee members will review the CNSC’s processes
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including the immediate response to the Fukushima incident, its connections with the rest of government and international organizations and its interactions with the Canadian nuclear sector and its regulated industries. They will also review the CNSC’s communications with affected stakeholders, including governments, other nuclear regulators, and the public. Finally the committee will assess the implications on the CNSC’s regulatory approaches resulting from the international response to Fukushima, such as international stress tests and the International Atomic Energy Agency action plan.
“This committee is comprised of independent experts in energy, innovation, engineering, governance and safety from outside of the nuclear sector,” said CNSC President, Michael Binder. “Thanks to the quality and diversity of their respective expertise, they will bring a distinct perspective to the analysis of the situation. I look forward to their findings.”
Extraído de:
http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/mediacentre/releases/
news_release.cfm?news_release_id=389
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CNSC Fukushima Task Force Report
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), October 2011, 105 p.
The CNSC Fukushima Task Force was established under the authority of the Executive Vice-President and Chief Regulatory Operations Officer, Ramzi Jammal, to evaluate operational, technical and regulatory implications on Canadian nuclear power plants (NPPs) from the 2011 nuclear event in Fukushima, Japan.
The work of the Task Force was led by Dr. Greg Rzentkowski, Director General of the Directorate of Power Reactor Regulation, who is responsible for implementing regulatory actions, including policy decisions, regulatory requirements and recommendations for safety upgrades at Canadian NPPs. |
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