Securing the Bomb 2008
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, November 2008, 205 p.

Securing the Bomb 2008, commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, finds that the world still faces a "very real" risk that terrorists could get a nuclear bomb. The Obama Administration must make reducing that risk a top priority of U.S. security policy and diplomacy, according to the report, which is accompanied by a paper offering a specific agenda for the presidential transition and the opening weeks of the new administration.

Extraído de: 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/cnwm_home.asp

Documentación empleada en la regulación de las instalaciones nucleares. Guía de Seguridad
IAEA, 2008, 49 p.

This Safety Guide provides recommendations for regulatory bodies and operators on how to meet the requirements in respect of documentation for use in regulating nuclear facilities established in Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-1, Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety (2000). It supersedes Safety Series No. 50-SG-G8, Licences for Nuclear Power Plants: Content, Format and Legal Considerations: A Safety Guide (1982), and

Safety Series No. 50-SG-G9, Regulations and Guides for Nuclear Power Plants: A Safety Guide (1984).

Le point de vue de l’IRSN sur la sûreté et la radioprotection du parc électronucléaire français en 2007
Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), 2008, 63 p.

L’appréciation de l’IRSN sur la sûreté du parc nucléaire français a été établie à partir d’une analyse des informations transmises par les exploitants et d’études menées en propre. Elle s’organise autour des points suivants : tout d’abord, l’examen global de l’année 2007 confirme qu’aucun évènement grave pour la sûreté ne s’est produit. Ce résultat positif est nuancé par la persistance - voire l’augmentation - d’évènements significatifs pour la sûreté ayant essentiellement pour cause le facteur humain, les aspects organisationnels et les défauts de rigueur d’exploitation. Dans le cadre de son appui technique à l'Autorité de sûreté nucléaire, l’IRSN suivra avec attention les démarches collectives engagées par EDF dans ces domaines. Par ailleurs, l’anomalie générique découverte sur le parc, relative au colmatage du circuit secondaire des générateurs de vapeur, a été examinée de près par l’IRSN et a conduit à l’adoption de mesures spécifiques par EDF, du fait de l’impact potentiel de ce phénomène sur la sûreté. Enfin, il convient de souligner la mise en œuvre, en 2007, de mesures significatives de renforcement de la sûreté telles que l’implantation de recombineurs d’hydrogène1 sur l’ensemble des réacteurs ou l’adoption d’un plan de renforcement de la protection des centrales contre le risque d’inondation.L’évolution de l’exploitation du parc est également caractérisée par la mise en place de deux nouvelles gestions de combustible, que l’IRSN a analysées de manière détaillée au plan de la sûreté.

Extraído de: http://www.irsn.fr/index.php?module=presse&action=
getCom&mode=topten&com_id=316&lgcode=FR

Fast Reactor Knowledge Preservation System: Taxonomy and Basic Requirements 
IAEA Nuclear Energy Series, 2008, 79 p.

As part of an initiative to preserve knowledge in the area of fast reactors, the purpose of this publication is to develop a taxonomy of the Fast Reactor Knowledge Preservation System (FRKPS) that will facilitate the preservation of the world’s knowledge base in this area, and to identify basic requirements of this taxonomy on the basis of experience gained. The need for such taxonomy arises from the fact that during the past 15 years there has been stagnation in the development of fast reactors in

many countries that were formerly involved in intensive development. Many specialists who were involved in the studies and development work have already retired or are coming close to retirement. In other countries that are still actively pursuing the evolution of fast reactor technology, the lack of young scientists and engineers moving into this branch of nuclear power is a critical issue.

Extraído de: http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/PubDetails.asp?pubId=7663

Commission Proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) setting up a Community framework for nuclear safety
Commission of the European Communities, 2008, 18 p.

“This Directive will benefit EU citizens by improving their safety and giving them legal certainty. Member States will have a common reference framework for their respective national nuclear safety systems and retain the right to apply more stringent rules if required.” said Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs.

The cross-border risks associated with the operation of nuclear

installations is well known, but there has only been limited standardisation of safety requirements between Member States until now. The recent renewed interest in the use of nuclear energy makes convergence rules at EU level even more necessary in order to support the Member States in their efforts to continuously improve nuclear safety.
The general objective of the proposal is to achieve, maintain and continuously improve nuclear safety and its regulation in the Community and to enhance the role of the regulatory bodies. Its scope of application is the design, siting, construction, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations, for which consideration of safety is required under the legislative and regulatory framework of the Member State concerned. The right of each Member State to use nuclear energy or not in its energy mix is recognised and fully respected.
The new Directive is firmly anchored in the subsidiarity principle as it aims at enhancing the role of the national nuclear safety control bodies, their independence and resources in fulfilling their tasks.
The proposal – which replaces and updates the one tabled in September 2004 – is based on the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Fundamentals. The High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management (ENSREG), will become the focal point of cooperation between regulators and will contribute to the continuous improvement of nuclear safety requirements, especially with respect to new reactors. The proposal foresees that the Commission shall present a report to the Council on progress made with the implementation of this Directive, accompanied, if appropriate, by legislative proposals.

Extraído de:  http://www.europeanenergyforum.eu/archives/european-union/eu-general-topic-file/eu-energy-sources-primary-secondary/eu-non-renewable-sectors/eu-non-fossil-sectors/eu-nuclear-sector/community-framework-for-nuclear-safety/commission-proposal-for-a-council-directive-euratom-setting-up-a-community-framework-for-nuclear-safety

Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities. Safety Requirements 
IAEA Safety Standards Series, 2008, 91 p.

This publication covers the broad scope of requirements for fuel cycle facilities that, in light of the experience and present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure safety for the lifetime of the facility. Topics of specific reference include aspects of nuclear fuel generation, storage, reprocessing and disposal.

Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. The Safety objective, concepts and safety principles; 3. Legal framework and regulatory supervision;

4. The management system and verification of safety; 5. Siting of the facility; 6. Design of the facility; 7. Construction of the facility; 8. Commissioning of the facility; 9. Operation of the facility; 10. Decommissioning of the facility; Appendix I: Requirements specific to uranium fuel fabrication facilities; Appendix II: Requirements specific to mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities; Appendix III: Requirements specific to conversion facilities and enrichment facilities

Extraído de: http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/PubDetails.asp?pubId=7881

Innovative and Adaptive Technologies in Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities 
IAEA TECDOC Series, 2008, 290 p.

There are large numbers of old reactors, other nuclear facilities and legacy sites worldwide that are either being actively dismantled or are candidates for decommissioning in the near term. A good portion of these facilities are situated in Member States that do not have adequate expertise and technologies for planning and implementing state-of-the-art decommissioning projects. The technology selection process is critical in that regard.

Currently, a global picture of decommissioning technologies shows that most
decommissioning technologies are readily available in industrialized countries. This includes, but is not limited to: characterization, decontamination, segmenting, and related waste management. However it should be noted, first, that such technologies can hardly be deployed without consideration of and adaptation to the working environment (layout, radiation and contamination levels, temperature etc). Secondly, the selection process of alternative technologies available in the market is not a simple one (except for routine, standard applications) in that it involves consideration of a number of technical factors (performance, speed, waste generation etc) and managerial factors (direct and indirect costs, manpower,
skills, hazards etc), and of the advantages and drawbacks of individual technologies. The final selection will generally be based on a case-by-case cost-benefit or multi-attribute analysis. A standardized approach in technology selection is currently applicable in a minority of cases only. Thirdly, there are a few ecommissioning aspects where technologies still have to be further developed to achieve full maturity. To mention a few, this is the case of management of special materials (graphite, beryllium), very low level detection of radioactivity
concentrations, and remote operation/robotics. The unique design of some older prototype facilities may add complications that can only be solved on a case-by-case basis at the decommissioning stage. As a general point for industrialized countries, those responsible for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities may be reluctant to promote innovation if they do not see commercial advantage.

Extraído de:
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/TE_1602_web.pdf